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Power Allocation Games in Interference Relay
Channels: Existence Analysis of Nash Equilibria
Elena Veronica Belmega, Brice Djeumou, and Samson Lasaulce
Abstract
We consider a network composed of two interfering point-to-point links where the two transmitters can exploit
one common relay node to improve their individual transmission rate. Communications are assumed to be multi-
band and transmitters are assumed to selfishly allocate their resources to optimize their individual transmission rate.
The main objective of this paper is to show that this conflicting situation (modeled by a non-cooperative game) has
some stable outcomes, namely Nash equilibria. This result is proved for three different types of relaying protocols:
decode-and-forward, estimate-and-forward, and amplify-and-forward. We provide additional results on the problems
of uniqueness, efficiency of the equilibrium, and convergence of a best-response based dynamics to the equilibrium.
These issues are analyzed in a special case of the amplify-and-forward protocol and illustrated by simulations in
general.
Index Terms
Cognitive radio, game theory, interference channel, interference relay channel, Nash equilibrium, power allocation
games, relay channel.
I. INTRODUCTION
A possible way to improve the performance in terms of range, transmission rate or quality of a network
composed of mutual interfering independent source-destination links, is to add some relaying nodes in the
network. This approach can be relevant in both wired and wireless networks. For example, it can be desirable
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2and even necessary to improve the performance of the (wired) link between the digital subscriber line (DSL)
access multiplexors (or central office) and customers’ facilities and/or the (wireless) links between some
access points and their respective receivers (personal computers, laptops, etc). The mentioned scenarios give
a strong motivation for studying the following system composed of two transmitters communicating with
their respective receivers and which can use a relay node. The channel model used to analyze this type of
network has been called the interference relay channel (IRC) in [3][4] where the authors introduce a channel
with two transmitters, two receivers, and one relay, all of them operating in the same frequency band. The
main contribution of [3][4] is to derive achievable transmission rate regions for Gaussian IRCs assuming
that the relay is implementing the decode-and-forward protocol (DF) and dirty paper coding.
In this paper, we consider multi-band interference relay channels and three different types of protocols at
the relay, namely DF, estimate-and-forward (EF), and amplify-and-forward (AF). One of our main objectives
is to study the corresponding power allocation (PA) problems at the transmitters. To this end, we proceed in
two main steps. First, we provide achievable transmission rates for single-band Gaussian IRCs when DF, EF,
and AF are respectively assumed. Second, we use these results to analyze the properties of the transmission
rates for the multi-band case. In the multi-band case, we assume that the transmitters are decision makers
that can freely choose their own resource allocation policies while selfishly maximizing their transmission
rates. This resource allocation problem can be modeled as a static non-cooperative game. The closest works
concerning the game-theoretic approach we adopt here seem to be [5][6][7][8] and [9][10][11]. In [5] [6], the
authors study the frequency selective and the parallel interference channels and provide sufficient conditions
on the channel gains that ensure the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium (NE) and convergence
of iterative water-filling algorithms. These conditions have been further refined in [7]. In [9], a traffic game
in parallel relay networks is considered where each source chooses its power allocation policy to minimize
a certain cost function. The price of anarchy [12] is analyzed in such a scenario. In [10], a quite similar
analysis is conducted for multi-hop networks. In [11], the authors consider a special case of the Gaussian
IRC where there are no direct links between the sources and destinations and there are two dedicated relays
(one for each source-destination pair) implementing DF. The power allocation game consists in sharing the
user’s power between the source and relay transmission. The existence, uniqueness of, and convergence to a
NE issues are addressed. In the present paper however, we mainly focus on the existence issue of an NE in
the games under study, which is already a non-trivial problem. The uniqueness, efficiency, and the design of
convergent distributed power allocation algorithms are studied only in a special case and the generalization
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3is left as very useful extension of the present paper.
This paper is structured as follows. Sec. II describes the system model and assumptions in multi-band
IRCs. Sec. III provides achievable transmission rates for single-band IRCs. These rates are exploited further
in multi-band IRCs (as users’ utility functions) analyzed in Sec. IV where the existence issue of NE in the
non-cooperative power allocation game is studied. Three relaying protocols are considered: DF, EF, and AF.
Sec. IV provides additional results on uniqueness of NE and convergence to NE for the AF protocol. Sec.
V illustrates simulations highlighting the importance of optimally locating the relay and the efficiency of
the possible NE. We conclude with summarizing remarks and possible extensions in Sec. VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
The system under investigation is represented in Fig. 1. It is composed of two source nodes S1, S2 (also
called transmitters), transmitting their private messages to their respective destination nodes D1, D2 (also
called receivers). To this end, each source can exploit Q non-overlapping frequency bands (the notation
(q) will be used to refer to band q ∈ {1, . . . , Q}) which are assumed to be of unit bandwidth. The signals
transmitted by S1 and S2 in band (q), denoted by X(q)1 and X(q)2 , respectively, are assumed to be independent
and power constrained:
∀i ∈ {1, 2},
Q∑
q=1
E|X(q)i |2 ≤ Pi. (1)
For i ∈ {1, 2}, we denote by θ(q)i the fraction of power that is used by Si for transmitting in band (q) that
is, E|X(q)i |2 = θ(q)i Pi. Additionally, we assume that there exists a multi-band relay R. With these notations,
the signals received by D1, D2, and R in band (q) express as:

Y
(q)
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where Z(q)i ∼ N (0, N (q)i ), i ∈ {1, 2, r}, represents the Gaussian complex noise on band (q) and, for all
(i, j) ∈ {1, 2}2, h(q)ij is the channel gain between Si and Dj and h(q)ir is the channel gain between Si and R in
band (q). The channel gains are considered to be static. In wireless networks, this would amount, for instance,
to considering a realistic situation where only large scale propagation effects can be taken into account by
the transmitters to optimize their rates. The proposed approach can be applied to other types of channel
models. Concerning channel state information (CSI), we will always assume coherent communications
November 2, 2018 DRAFT
4for each transmitter-receiver pair (Si,Di) whereas, at the transmitters, the information assumptions will be
context dependent. The single-user decoding (SUD) will always be assumed at D1 and D2. This is a realistic
assumption in a framework where devices communicate in an a priori uncoordinated manner. At the relay,
the implemented reception scheme will depend on the protocol assumed. The expressions of the signals
transmitted by the relay, X(q)r , q ∈ {1, ..., Q}, depend on the relay protocol assumed and will therefore also
be explained in the corresponding sections. So far, we have not mentioned any power constraint on the
signals X(q)r . Note that the signal model (2) is sufficiently general for addressing two important scenarios.
If one imposes an overall power constraint
∑Q
q=1 E|X(q)r |2 ≤ Pr, multi-carrier IRCs with a single relay can
be studied. On the other hand, if one imposes E|X(q)r |2 ≤ P (q)r , q ∈ {1, ..., Q}, multi-band IRCs where a
relay is available on each band (the relays are not necessarily co-located) can be studied. In this paper, for
simplicity reasons and as a first step towards solving the general problem (where both source and relaying
nodes optimize their PA policies) we will assume that the relay implements a fixed power allocation policy
between the Q available bands (E|X(q)r |2 = P (q)r , q ∈ {1, ..., Q}).
To conclude this section, we will mention and justify one additional assumption. As in [4][3][13], the
relay will be assumed to operate in the full-duplex mode. Mathematically, it is known from [14] that the
achievability proofs for the full-duplex case can be almost directly applied the half-duplex case. But this
is not our main motivation. Our main motivation is that, in some communication scenarios, the full-duplex
assumption is realistic (see e.g., [1] where the transmit and receive radio-frequency parts are not co-located)
and even more suited. In the scenario of DSL systems mentioned in Sec. I, the relay is connected to
the source and destination through wired links. This allows the implementation of full-duplex repeaters,
amplifiers, or digital relays. The same comment can be applied to optical communications.
Notational conventions
The capacity function for complex signals is denoted by C(x) , log2(1 + x); for all a ∈ [0, 1], the
quantity a stands for a = 1 − a; the notation −i means that −i = 1 if i = 2 and −i = 2 if i = 1; for all
complex numbers c ∈ C, c∗, |c|, Re(c) and Im(c) denote the complex conjugate, modulus and the real and
imaginary parts respectively.
III. ACHIEVABLE TRANSMISSION RATES FOR SINGLE-BAND IRCS
This section provides preliminary results regarding the achievable rate regions for the IRCs assuming DF,
EF, and AF protocols. They are necessary to express transmission rates in the multi-band case. Thus, we do
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5not aim at improving available rate regions for IRCs as in [13] and related works [15][16][17]. In the latter
references, the authors consider some special cases of the discrete IRC and derive rate regions based on the
DF protocol and different coding-decoding schemes. In what follows, we make some suboptimal choices for
the used coding-decoding schemes and relaying protocols which are motivated by a decentralized framework
where each destination does not know the codebook used by the other destination. This approach, facilitates
the deployment of relays since the receivers do not need to be modified. In particular, this explains why we
do not exploit techniques like rate-splitting or successive interference cancellation. As we assume single-
band IRCs, we have that Q = 1. For the sake of clarity, we omit the superscript (1) from the different
quantities used e.g., X(1)i becomes in this section Xi.
A. Transmission rates for the DF protocol
One of the purposes of this section is to state a corollary from [3]. Indeed, the given result corresponds
to the special case of the rate region derived in [3] where each source sends to its respective destination a
private message only (and not both public and private messages as in [3]). The reason for providing this
region here is threefold: it is necessary for the multi-band case, it is used in the simulation part to establish
a comparison between the different relaying protocols under consideration in this paper, and it makes the
paper sufficiently self-contained. The principle of the DF protocol is detailed in [14] and we give here
only the main idea behind it. Consider a Gaussian relay channel where the source-relay link has a better
quality than the source-destination link. From each message intended for the destination, the source builds
a coarse and a fine message. With these two messages, the source superposes two codewords. The rates
associated with these codewords (or messages) are such that the relay can reliably decode both of them
while the destination can only decode the coarse message. After decoding this message, the destination
can subtract the corresponding signal and try to decode the fine message. To help the destination to do so,
the relay cooperates with the source by sending some information about the fine message. Mathematically,
this translates as follows. The signal transmitted by Si is structured as Xi = Xi0 +
√
τi
νi
Pi
Pr
Xri. The signals
Xi0 and Xri are independent and correspond to the coarse and fine messages respectively; the parameter
νi represents the fraction of transmit power the relay allocates to user i, hence we have ν1 + ν2 ≤ 1; the
parameter τi represents the fraction of transmit power Si allocates to the cooperation signal (conveying the
fine message). Therefore, we have the following result.
Corollary 3.1 ([3]): When DF is assumed, the region in (3) is achievable; for i ∈ {1, 2}, where j = −i,
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6Ri ≤ min
{
C
( |hir|2τiPi
|hjr|2τjPj +Nr
)
, C
(
|hii|2Pi + |hri|2νiPr + 2Re(hiih∗ri)
√
τiPiνiPr
|hji|2Pj + |hri|2νjPr + 2Re(hjih∗ri)
√
τjPjνjPr +Ni
)}
(3)
(ν1, ν2) ∈ [0, 1]2 s.t. ν1 + ν2 ≤ 1 and (τ1, τ2) ∈ [0, 1]2, τ1 + τ2 ≤ 1.
In a context of decentralized networks, each source Si has to optimize the parameter τi in order to
maximize its transmission rate Ri. In the rate region above, one can observe that this choice is not independent
of the choice of the other source. Therefore, each source finds its optimal strategy by optimizing its rate
w.r.t. τ ∗i (τj). In order to do that, each source has to make some assumptions on the value τj used by the
other source. This is precisely a non-cooperative game where each player makes some assumptions on the
other player’s behavior and maximizes its own utility. Interestingly, we see that, even in the single-band case,
the DF protocol introduces a power allocation game through the parameter τi representing the cooperation
degree between the source Si and relay. In this paper, for obvious reasons of space, we will restrict our
attention to the case where the cooperation degrees are fixed. In other words, in the multi-band scenario,
the transmitter strategy will consist in choosing only the power allocation policy over the available bands.
For more details on the game induced by the cooperation degrees the reader is referred to [2].
B. Transmission rates for the EF protocol
Here, we consider a second main class of relaying protocols, namely the estimate-and-forward protocol. A
well-known property of the EF protocol for the relay channel [14] is that it always improves the performance
of the receiver w.r.t. the case without relay (in contrast with DF protocols which can degrade the performance
of the point-to-point link). The principle of the EF protocol for the standard relay channel is that the relay
sends an approximated version of its observation signal to the receiver. More precisely, from an information-
theoretic point of view [14], the relay compresses its observation in the Wyner-Ziv manner [18], i.e., knowing
that the destination also receives a direct signal from the source that is correlated with the signal to be
compressed. The compression rate is precisely tuned by taking into account this correlation degree and the
quality of the relay-destination link. In our setup, we have two different receivers. The relay can either
create a single quantized version of its observation, common to both receivers, or two quantized versions,
one adapted for each destination. We have chosen the second type of quantization which we call the “bi-
level compression EF”. We note the work by [19] where the authors consider a different channel, namely a
November 2, 2018 DRAFT
7R1 ≤ C

 |h11|2P1
N1 +
|h21|2P2
(
Nr+N
(1)
wz
)
|h2r |2P2+Nr+N
(1)
wz
+
|h1r|2P1
Nr +N
(1)
wz +
|h2r|2P2N1
|h21|2P2+N1

 , (4)
R2 ≤ C

 |h22|2P2
N2 + |hr2|2ν1Pr +
|h12|2P1
(
Nr+N
(2)
wz
)
|h1r |2P1+Nr+N
(2)
wz
+
|h2r|2P2
Nr +N
(2)
wz +
|h1r|2P1(|hr2|2ν1Pr+N2)
|h12|2P1+|hr2|2ν1Pr+N2

 , (5)
separated two-way relay channel, and exploit a similar idea, namely using two quantization levels at the relay.
In the scheme used here, each receiver decodes independently its own message, which is less demanding
than a joint decoding scheme in terms of information assumptions. As we have already mentioned, the
relay implements the Wyner-Ziv compression and superposition coding similarly to a broadcast channel.
The difference with the broadcast channel is that each destination also receives the two direct signals from
the source nodes. The rate region which can be obtained by using such a coding scheme is given by the
following theorem proved in Appendix A.
Theorem 3.2: For the Gaussian IRC with private messages and bi-level compression EF protocol, any
rate pair (R1, R2) is achievable where
1) if C
(
|hr1|
2ν2Pr
|h11|2P1 + |h21|2P2 + |hr1|2ν1Pr +N1
)
≥ C
(
|hr2|
2ν2Pr
|h22|2P2 + |h12|2P1 + |hr2|2ν1Pr +N2
)
, we have the rates in
(4), (5) subject to the constraints
 N
(1)
wz ≥ (|h11|
2P1+|h21|
2P2+N1)A−A21
|hr1|2ν1Pr
N
(2)
wz ≥ (|h22|
2P2+|h12|
2P1+|hr2|
2ν1Pr+N2)A−A22
|hr2|2ν2Pr
,
2) else, if C
(
|hr2|
2ν1Pr
|h22|2P2 + |h12|2P1 + |hr2|2ν2Pr +N2
)
≥ C
(
|hr1|
2ν1Pr
|h11|2P1 + |h21|2P1 + |hr1|2ν2Pr +N1
)
, we have the rates
in (6), (7) subject to the constraints
 N
(1)
wz ≥ (|h11|
2P1+|h21|
2P2+|hr1|
2ν2Pr+N1)A−A21
|hr1|2ν1Pr
N
(2)
wz ≥ (|h22|
2P2+|h12|
2P1+N2)A−A22
|hr2|2ν2Pr
,
3) else the rates are given by (8), (9) subject to the constraints
 N
(1)
wz ≥ (|h11|
2P1+|h21|
2P2+|hr1|
2ν2Pr+N1)A−A21
|hr1|2ν1Pr
N
(2)
wz ≥ (|h22|
2P2+|h12|
2P1+|hr2|
2ν1Pr+N2)A−A22
|hr2|2ν2Pr
,
with N (i)wz representing the quantization noise corresponding to receiver i, (ν1, ν2) ∈ [0, 1]2, ν1+ν2 ≤ 1, the relay
PA, A = |h1r|2P1 + |h2r|2P2 +Nr, A1 = 2Re(h11h∗1r)P1 + 2Re(h21h∗2r)P2 and A2 = 2Re(h12h∗1r)P1 + 2Re(h22h∗2r)P2.
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
 |h11|2P1
N1 + |hr1|2ν2Pr +
|h21|2P2
(
Nr+N
(1)
wz
)
|h2r|2P2+Nr+N
(1)
wz
+
|h1r|2P1
Nr +N
(1)
wz +
|h2r|2P2(|hr1|2ν2Pr+N1)
|h21|2P2+|hr1|2ν2Pr+N1

 , (6)
R2 ≤ C

 |h22|2P2
N2 +
|h12|2P1
(
Nr+N
(2)
wz
)
|h1r|2P1+Nr+N
(2)
wz
+
|h2r|2P2
Nr +N
(2)
wz +
|h1r |2P1N2
|h12|2P1+N2

 , (7)
R1 ≤ C

 |h11|2P1
N1 + |hr1|2ν2Pr +
|h21|2P2
(
Nr+N
(1)
wz
)
|h2r|2P2+Nr+N
(1)
wz
+
|h1r|2P1
Nr +N
(1)
wz +
|h2r|2P2(|hr1|2ν2Pr+N1)
|h21|2P2+|hr1|2ν2Pr+N1

 , (8)
R2 ≤ C

 |h22|2P2
N2 + |hr2|2ν1Pr +
|h12|2P1
(
Nr+N
(2)
wz
)
|h1r|2P1+Nr+N
(2)
wz
+
|h2r|2P2
Nr +N
(2)
wz +
|h1r|2P1(|hr2|2ν1Pr+N2)
|h12|2P1+|hr2|2ν1Pr+N2

 , (9)
The three scenarios emphasized in this theorem correspond to the following situations: 1) D1 has the better
link (in the sense of the theorem) and can decode both the relay message intended for D2 and its own
message; 2) this scenario is the dual of scenario 1); 3) in this latter scenario, each destination node sees the
cooperation signal intended for the other destination node as interference.
C. Transmission rates for the AF protocol
In this section, the relay is assumed to implement an analog amplifier which does not introduce any delay
on the relayed signal. The main features of AF-type protocols are well-known by now (e.g., such relays
are generally cheap, involve low complexity relay transceivers, and generally induce negligible processing
delays in contrast with DF and EF-type relaying protocols). The relay merely sends Xr = arYr where
ar corresponds to the relay amplification factor/gain. We call the corresponding protocol the zero-delay
scalar amplify-and-forward (ZDSAF). The type of assumptions we make here fits well to the setting of
DSL or optical communication networks. In wireless networks, the assumed protocol can be seen as an
approximation of a scenario with a relay equipped with a power amplifier only. The following theorem
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9provides a region of transmission rates that can be achieved when the transmitters send private messages to
their respective receivers, the relay implements the ZDSAF protocol and the receivers implement single-user
decoding. The considered framework is attractive in the sense that an AF-based relay can be added to the
network without changing the receivers.
Theorem 3.3 (Transmission rate region for the IRC with ZDSAF): Let Ri, i ∈ {1, 2}, be the transmission
rate for the source node Si. When ZDSAF is assumed the following region is achievable:
∀i ∈ {1, 2}, RAFi ≤ C
(
|ar hirhri+hii|
2ρi
|ar hjrhri+hji|
2ρj
Nj
Ni
+a2r |hri|
2Nr
Ni
+1
)
(10)
where ρi = PiNi , j = −i, and ar is the relay amplification gain.
The proof of this result is standard [20] and will therefore be omitted. Only two points are worth being
mentioned. First, the proposed region is achieved by using Gaussian codebooks. Second, the choice of the
value of the amplification gain ar is not always straightforward. In the vast majority of the papers available
in the literature, ar is chosen in order to saturate the power constraint at the relay (E|Xr|2 = Pr) that
is: ar = ar ,
√
Pr
E|Yr|
2 =
√
Pr
|h1r|2P1+|h2r|2P2+Nr
. However, as mentioned in some works [21][22][23][24],
this choice can be sub-optimal in the sense of certain performance criteria. The intuitive reason for this is
that the AF protocol not only amplifies the useful signal but also the received noise. This effect can be
negligible in certain scenarios for the standard relay channel but can be significant for the IRC. Indeed,
even if the noise at the relay is negligible, the interference term for user i (i.e., the term hjrXj , j = −i)
can be influential. In order to assess the importance of choosing amplification factor ar adequately (i.e.,
to maximize the transmission rate of a given user or the network sum-rate) we derive its best value. The
proposed derivation differs from [21][23] because, here, we consider a different system (an IRC instead
of a relay channel with no direct link), a specific relaying function (linear relaying functions instead of
arbitrary functions) and a different performance metric (individual transmission rate and sum-rate instead of
raw bit error rate [21] and mutual information [23]). Our problem is also different from [24] since we do
not consider the optimal clipping threshold in the sense of the end-to-end distortion for frequency division
relay channels. At last, the main difference with [22] is that, for the relay channel, the authors discuss the
choice of the optimal amplification gain in terms of transmission rate for a vector AF protocol having a
delay of at least one symbol duration; here we focus on a scalar AF protocol with no delay and a different
system namely the IRC. In this setup, we have found an analytical expression for the best ar in the sense
of Ri(ar) for a given user i ∈ {1, 2}. We have also noticed that the ar maximizing the network sum-rate
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10
has to be computed numerically in general. The corresponding analytical result is stated in the following
theorem.
Theorem 3.4: [Optimal amplification gain for the ZDSAF in the IRC] The transmission rate of user i,
Ri(ar), as a function of ar ∈ [0, ar] can have several critical points which are the real solutions, denoted
by c(1)r,i and c
(2)
r,i , to the following second degree equation:
a2r [|mi|2Re(piq∗i )− (|pi|2 + si)Re(min∗i )] + ar [|mi|2(|qi|2 + 1)− |ni|2(|pi|2 + si)]
+(|qi|2 + 1)Re(min∗i )− |ni|2Re(piq∗i ) = 0
(11)
where mi = hirhri
√
ρi, ni = hii
√
ρi, pi = hjrhri
√
ρj , qi = hji
√
ρj , si = |hri|2, i ∈ {1, 2} and j = −i.
Thus, depending on the channel parameters, the optimal amplification gain a∗r = arg max
ar∈[0,ar]
Ri(ar) takes
one value in the set a∗r ∈ {0, ar, c(1)r,i , c(2)r,i }. If, additionally, the channel gains are reals then the two critical
points write as: c(1)r,i = − nimi and c
(2)
r,i = − miq
2
i+mi−piqini
miqipi−p2ini−nisi
.
The proof of this result is provided in Appendix B. Of course, in practice, if the receive signal-to-noise
plus interference ratio (viewed from a given user) at the relay is low, choosing the amplification factor ar
adequately does not solve the problem. It is well known that in real systems, a more efficient way to combat
noise is to implement error correcting codes. This is one of the reasons why DF is also an important relaying
protocol, especially for digital relay transceivers for which AF cannot be implemented in its standard form
(see e.g., [24] for more details).
D. Time-Sharing
In terms of achievable Shannon rates, distributed channels differ from their centralized counterpart. Indeed,
rate regions are not necessarily convex since the time-sharing argument can be invalid (if no synchronization
is possible). Similarly, depending on the channel gains, the achievable rate for a given transmitter can be non-
concave with respect to its power allocation policy. This happens if the transmitters cannot be coordinated
(distributed channels).
Assuming that the users can be coordinated, we discuss here a standard time-sharing procedure similarly
to the approach in [25] for the frequency-division relay channel. More specifically, we assume that user 1
decides to transmit only during a fraction α1 of the time using the power P1α1 and user 2 transmits only with
a fraction α2 percent of the time using the power P2α2 .
The achievable rate-region with coordinated time-sharing, irrespective of the relay protocol, is:
November 2, 2018 DRAFT
11
∀i ∈ {1, 2}, RTSi ≤ αiβjRi
(
Pi
αi
, 0
)
+ αiβjRi
(
Pi
αi
,
Pj
αj
)
, (12)
where j = −i, (αi, αj)2 ∈ [0, 1]2, (βi, βj)2 ∈ [0, 1]2 such that β1α2 = β2α1. The rate Ri
(
Pi
αi
, 0
)
represents
the achievable rate of user i (depends on the relay protocol and was provided in the previous subsections)
when user j doesn’t transmit and user i transmits with power Pi
αi
, Ri
(
Pi
αi
,
Pj
αj
)
is the achievable rate when
user i transmits with power Pi
αi
and user j transmits with power Pj
αj
. In order to achieve this rate region,
the users have to be coordinated. This means that they have to know at each instant if the other user is
transmitting or not. User i also has to know the parameters αi and αj . The parameter βj ∈ [0, 1] represents
the fraction of time when user j interferes with user i. Considering the time when both users transmit with
non-zero power, we obtain the condition: β1α2 = β2α1.
IV. POWER ALLOCATION GAMES IN MULTI-BAND IRCS AND NASH EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
In the previous section, we have considered the system model presented in Sec. II for Q = 1. Here,
we consider multi-band IRCs for which Q ≥ 2. As communications interfere on each band, choosing the
power allocation policy at a given transmitter is not a simple optimization problem. Indeed, this choice
depends on what the other transmitter does. Each transmitter is assumed to optimize its transmission rate
in a selfish manner by allocating its transmit power Pi between Q sub-channels and knowing that the other
transmitters want to do the same. This interaction can be modeled as a strategic form non-cooperative
game, G = (K, (Ai)i∈K, (ui)i∈K), where: (i) the players of the game are the two information sources or
transmitters and K = {1, 2} is used to refer to the set of players; (ii) the strategy of transmitter i consists
in choosing θi = (θ
(1)
i , . . . , θ
(Q)
i ) in its strategy set Ai =
{
θi ∈ [0, 1]Q
∣∣∣∣∣
Q∑
q=1
θ
(q)
i ≤ 1
}
where θ(q)i represents
the fraction of power used in band (q); (iii) ui(·) is the utility function of user i ∈ {1, 2} or its achievable
rate depending on the relaying protocol. From now on, we will call state of the network the (concatenated)
vector of power fractions that the transmitters allocate to the IRCs i.e., θ = (θ1, θ2). An important issue
is to determine whether there exist some outcomes to this conflicting situation. A natural solution concept
in non-cooperative games is the Nash equilibrium [26]. In distributed networks, the existence of a stable
operating state of the system is a desirable feature. In this respect, the NE is a stable state from which the
users do not have any incentive to unilaterally deviate (otherwise they would lose in terms of utility). The
mathematical definition is the following.
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

R
(q),DF
1,1 = C
( ∣∣∣h(q)1r ∣∣∣2τ (q)1 θ(q)1 P1∣∣∣h(q)2r ∣∣∣2τ (q)2 θ(q)2 P2+N(q)r
)
R
(q),DF
2,1 = C
( ∣∣∣h(q)2r ∣∣∣2τ (q)2 θ(q)2 P2∣∣∣h(q)1r ∣∣∣2τ (q)1 θ(q)1 P1+N(q)r
)
R
(q),DF
1,2 = C
( ∣∣∣h(q)11 ∣∣∣2θ(q)1 P1+∣∣∣h(q)r1 ∣∣∣2ν(q)P (q)r +2Re(h(q)11 h(q),∗r1 )√τ (q)1 θ(q)1 P1ν(q)P (q)r∣∣∣h(q)21 ∣∣∣2θ(q)2 P2+∣∣∣h(q)r1 ∣∣∣2ν(q)P (q)r +2Re(h(q)21 h(q),∗r1 )√τ (q)2 θ(q)2 P2ν(q)P (q)r +N(q)1
)
R
(q),DF
2,2 = C
( ∣∣∣h(q)22 ∣∣∣2θ(q)2 P2+∣∣∣h(q)r2 ∣∣∣2ν(q)P (q)r +2Re(h(q)22 h(q),∗r2 )√τ (q)2 θ(q)2 P2ν(q)P (q)r∣∣∣h(q)12 ∣∣∣2θ(q)1 P1+∣∣∣h(q)r2 ∣∣∣2ν(q)P (q)r +2Re(h(q)12 h(q),∗r2 )√τ (q)1 θ(q)1 P1ν(q)P (q)r +N(q)2
)
,
(14)
Definition 4.1: [Nash equilibrium] The state (θ∗i , θ∗−i) is a pure NE of the strategic form game G if
∀i ∈ K, ∀θ′i ∈ Ai, ui(θ∗i , θ∗−i) ≥ ui(θ′i, θ∗−i).
In this section, we mainly focus on the problem of existence of such a solution, which is the first step
towards equilibria characterization in IRCs. The problems of equilibrium uniqueness, selection, convergence,
and efficiency are therefore left as natural extensions of the work reported here.
A. Equilibrium existence analysis for the DF protocol
As explained in Sec. III-A the signals transmitted by S1 and S2 in band (q) have the following form:
X
(q)
i = X
(q)
i,0 +
√
τ
(q)
i
ν
(q)
i
θ
(q)
i Pi
P
(q)
r
X
(q)
r,i where the signals X
(q)
i,0 and X
(q)
r,i are Gaussian and independent. At the relay
R, the transmitted signal writes as: X(q)r = X(q)r,1 +X(q)r,2 . For a given allocation policy θi =
(
θ
(1)
i , ..., θ
(Q)
i
)
,
the source-destination pair (Si,Di) achieves the transmission rate
∑Q
q=1R
(q),DF
i where

R
(q),DF
1 = min
{
R
(q),DF
1,1 , R
(q),DF
1,2
}
R
(q),DF
2 = min
{
R
(q),DF
2,1 , R
(q),DF
2,2
} , (13)
and R(q),DF1,1 , R
(q),DF
1,2 ,R
(q),DF
2,1 ,R
(q),DF
2,2 are given in (14) and (ν(q), τ (q)1 , τ (q)2 ) is a given triple of parameters in
[0, 1]3, τ
(q)
1 + τ
(q)
2 ≤ 1.
The achievable transmission rate of user i is given by:
uDFi (θi, θ−i) =
Q∑
q=1
R
(q),DF
i (θ
(q)
i , θ
(q)
−i ). (15)
We suppose that the game is played once (one-shot or static game), the users are rational (each selfish player
does what is best for itself), rationality is common knowledge, and the game is with complete information
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that is, every player knows the triplet GDF = (K, (Ai)i∈K, (uDFi )i∈K). Although this setup might seem to be
demanding in terms of CSI at the source nodes, it turns out that the equilibria predicted in such a framework
can be effectively observed in more realistic frameworks where one player observes the strategy played by
the other player and reacts accordingly by maximizing his utility, the other player observes this and updates
its strategy and so on. We will come back to this later on. The existence theorem for the DF protocol is
given hereunder.
Theorem 4.2: [Existence of an NE for the DF protocol]
If the channel gains satisfy the condition Re(h(q)ii h(q)∗ri ) ≥ 0, for all i ∈ {1, 2} and q ∈ {1, . . . , Q} the game
defined by GDF = (K, (Ai)i∈K, (uDFi (θi, θ−i))i∈K) with K = {1, 2} and Ai =
{
θi ∈ [0, 1]Q
∣∣∣∣∣
Q∑
q=1
θ
(q)
i ≤ 1
}
,
has always at least one pure NE.
Proof: The proof is based on Theorem 1 of [27]. The latter theorem states that in a game with a finite
number of players, if for every player 1) the strategy set is convex and compact, 2) its utility is continuous
in the vector of strategies and 3) concave in its own strategy, then the existence of at least one pure NE
is guaranteed. In our setup checking that conditions 1) and 2) are met is straightforward. The condition
Re(h(q)ii h(q)∗ri ) ≥ 0 is a sufficient condition that ensures the concavity of RDFi,2 w.r.t. θ(q)i . The intuition behind
this condition is that the superposition of the two signals carrying useful information for user i (i.e., signal
from Si and R) has to be constructive w.r.t. the amplitude of the resulting signal. As the sum of concave
functions is a concave function, the min of two concave functions is a concave function (see [28] for more
details on operations preserving concavity), and R(q)i,j is a concave function of θi, it follows that 3) is also
met, which concludes the proof.
Theorem indicates, in particular, that for the pathloss model where the channel gains are positive real
scalars (i.e., hij > 0, (i, j) ∈ {1, 2, r}2) there always exists an equilibrium. As a consequence, if some
relays are added in the network, the transmitters will adapt their PA policies accordingly and, whatever
the locations of the relays, an equilibrium will be observed. This is a nice property for the system under
investigation. As the PA game with DF is concave it is tempting to try to verify whether the sufficient
condition for uniqueness of [27] is met here. It turns out that the diagonally strict concavity condition of
[27] is not trivial to be checked. Additionally, it is possible that the game has several equilibria as it is
proven to be the case for the AF protocol.
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

R
(q),EF
1 = C
((∣∣∣h(q)2r ∣∣∣2θ(q)2 P2+N(q)r +N(q)wz,1)∣∣∣h(q)11 ∣∣∣2θ(q)1 P1+(∣∣∣h(q)21 ∣∣∣2θ(q)2 P2+∣∣∣h(q)r1 ∣∣∣2ν(q)P (q)r +N(q)1 )∣∣∣h(q)1r ∣∣∣2θ(q)1 P1(
N
(q)
r +N
(q)
wz,1
)(
|h
(q)
21 |
2θ
(q)
2 P2+|h
(q)
r1 |
2ν(q)P
(q)
r +N
(q)
1
)
+|h
(q)
2r |
2θ
(q)
2 P2
(
|h
(q)
r1 |
2ν(q)P
(q)
r +N
(q)
1
)
)
R
(q),EF
2 = C
((
|h1r|2θ
(q)
1 P1+N
(q)
r +N
(q)
wz,2
)∣∣∣h(q)22
∣∣∣2θ(q)2 P2+
(∣∣∣h(q)12
∣∣∣2θ(q)1 P1+
∣∣∣h(q)r2
∣∣∣2ν(q)P (q)r +N(q)2
)∣∣∣h(q)2r
∣∣∣2θ(q)2 P2(
N
(q)
r +N
(q)
wz,2
)(∣∣∣h(q)12
∣∣∣2θ(q)1 P1+
∣∣∣h(q)r2
∣∣∣2ν(q)P (q)r +N(q)2
)
+
∣∣∣h(q)1r
∣∣∣2θ(q)1 P1
(∣∣∣h(q)r2
∣∣∣2ν(q)P (q)r +N(q)2
)
) , (17)


N
(q)
wz,1 =
(∣∣∣h(q)11
∣∣∣2θ(q)1 P1+
∣∣∣h(q)21
∣∣∣2θ(q)2 P2+
∣∣∣h(q)r1
∣∣∣2ν(q)P (q)r +N(q)1
)
A(q)−
∣∣∣A(q)1
∣∣∣2
∣∣∣h(q)r1
∣∣∣2ν(q)P (q)r
N
(q)
wz,2 =
(∣∣∣h(q)22
∣∣∣2θ(q)2 P2+
∣∣∣h(q)12
∣∣∣2θ(q)1 P1+
∣∣∣h(q)r2
∣∣∣2ν(q)P (q)r +N(q)2
)
A(q)−
∣∣∣A(q)2
∣∣∣2
∣∣∣h(q)r2
∣∣∣2ν(q)P (q)r
(18)
B. Equilibrium existence analysis for the EF protocol
In this section, we make the same assumptions as in Sec. IV-A concerning the reception schemes and
PA policies at the relays: we assume that each node R, D1 and D2 implements single-user decoding and
the PA policy at each relay i.e., ν =
(
ν(1), ..., ν(Q)
)
is fixed. Each relay now implements the EF protocol.
Under this assumption, the utility for user i ∈ {1, 2} can be expressed as follows
uEFi (θi, θ−i) =
Q∑
q=1
R
(q),EF
i (16)
where R(q),EFi are given in (17) ν(q) ∈ [0, 1], A(q) = |h(q)1r |2θ(q)1 P1+|h(q)2r |2θ(q)2 P2+N (q)r , A(q)1 = h(q)11 h(q),∗1r θ(q)1 P1+
h
(q)
21 h
(q),∗
2r θ
(q)
2 P2 and A
(q)
2 = h
(q)
12 h
(q),∗
1r θ
(q)
1 P1 + h
(q)
22 h
(q),∗
2r θ
(q)
2 P2. What is interesting with this EF protocol is
that, here again, one can prove that the utility is concave for every user. This is the purpose of the following
theorem.
Theorem 4.3: [Existence of an NE for the bi-level compression EF protocol] The game defined by GEF =
(K, (Ai)i∈K, (uEFi (θi, θ−i))i∈K) with K = {1, 2} and Ai =
{
θi ∈ [0, 1]Q
∣∣∣∣∣
Q∑
q=1
θ
(q)
i ≤ 1
}
, has always at least
one pure NE.
The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem IV-A. To be able to apply Theorem 1 of Rosen [27], we
have to prove that the utility uEFi is concave w.r.t. θi. The problem is less simple than for DF because the
compression noise N (q)wz,i which appears in the denominator of the capacity function in Eq. (17) depends on
the strategy θi of transmitter i. It turns out that it is still possible to prove the desired result as shown in
Appendix C.
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R
(q),AF
i = C
( ∣∣∣ h(q)ir h(q)ri ∣∣∣2θ(q)i ρiρr NrNi∣∣∣h(q)ri ∣∣∣2θ(q)i ρi+(∣∣∣h(q)rj ∣∣∣2θ(q)j ρj NjNi +NrNi )(∣∣∣h(q)ri ∣∣∣2ρr NrNi +1)
)
(21)
C. Equilibrium analysis for the AF protocol
Here, we assume that the relay implements the ZDSAF protocol, which has already been described in Sec.
III-C. One of the nice features of the (analog) ZDSAF protocol is that relays are very easy to be deployed
since they can be used without any change on the existing (non-cooperative) communication system. The
amplification factor/gain for the relay on band (q) will be denoted by a(q)r . Here, we consider the most
common choice for the amplification factor that it, the one that exploits all the transmit power available on
each band. The achievable transmission rate is given by
uAFi (θi, θ−i) =
Q∑
q=1
R
(q),AF
i (θ
(q)
i , θ
(q)
−i ) (19)
where R(q),AFi is the rate user i obtains by using band (q) when the ZDSAF protocol is used by the relay
R. After Sec. III-C the latter quantity is:
∀i ∈ {1, 2}, R(q),AFi = C


∣∣∣a(q)r h(q)ir h(q)ri +h(q)ii
∣∣∣2θ(q)i ρi∣∣∣a(q)r hjrhri+hji
∣∣∣2ρjθ(q)j N
(q)
j
N
(q)
i
+
(
a
(q)
r
)2∣∣∣h(q)ri
∣∣∣2 N(q)r
N
(q)
i
+1

 , (20)
where a(q)r = a˜(q)r (θ(q)1 , θ
(q)
2 ) ,
√
Pr∣∣∣h(q)1r
∣∣∣2P1+|h2r |2P2+Nr and ρ
(q)
i =
Pi
N
(q)
i
. Without loss of generality and for the
sake of clarity we will assume in Sec. IV-C that ∀(i, q) ∈ {1, 2, r} × {1, . . . , Q}, N (q)i = N , P (q)r = Pr and
we introduce the quantities ρi = PiN . In this setup the following existence theorem can be proven.
Theorem 4.4: [Existence of an NE for ZDSAF] If any of the following conditions are met: i)
∣∣∣a(q)r h(q)ir h(q)ri ∣∣∣≫∣∣∣h(q)ii ∣∣∣ and ∣∣∣a(q)r h(q)jr h(q)ri ∣∣∣≫ ∣∣∣h(q)ji ∣∣∣ (negligible direct links), ii) ∣∣∣h(q)ii ∣∣∣≫ ∣∣∣a(q)r h(q)ir h(q)ri ∣∣∣ and∣∣∣h(q)ji ∣∣∣≫ ∣∣∣a(q)r h(q)jr ∣∣∣min{1, ∣∣∣h(q)ri ∣∣∣} (negligible relay links), iii) a(q)r = A(q)r ∈ [0, a˜(q)r (1, 1)] (constant amplifi-
cation gain), there exists at least one pure NE in the PA game GAF.
The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem IV-A. The sufficient conditions ensure the concavity of the
function R(q),AFi w.r.t. θ
(q)
i . For the first case i) where the direct links between the sources and destinations
are negligible (e.g., in the wired DSL setting these links are missing and the transmission is only possible
using the relay nodes), the achievable rates are given ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, in (21) and it can be proven that R(q),AFi is
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concave w.r.t. θ(q)i . The other two cases are easier to prove since the amplification gain is either constant or
not taken into account and the rate R(q),AFi is a composition of a logarithmic function and a linear function
of θ(q)i and thus concave.
The determination of NE and the convergence issue to one of the NE are far from being trivial in this case.
For example, potential games [29] and supermodular games [30] are known to have attractive convergence
properties. It can be checked that, the PA game under investigation is neither a potential nor a supermodular
game in general. To be more precise, it is a potential game for a set of channel gains which corresponds
to a scenario with probability zero (e.g., the parallel multiple access channel). The authors of [31] studied
supermodular games for the interference channel with K = 2, Q = 3, assuming that only one band is shared
by the users (IC) while the other bands are private (one interference-free band for each user). Therefore, each
user allocates its power between two bands. Their strategies are designed such that the game has strategic
complementarities. However, as stated in [31], this design trick does not work for more than two players or
if the users can access more than two frequency bands. In conclusion, general convergence results seem to
require more advanced tools and further investigations.
Special case study
As we have just mentioned, the uniqueness/convergence/efficiency analysis of NE for the DF and EF
protocols requires a separate work to be treated properly. However, it is possible to obtain relatively easy
some interesting results in a special case of the AF protocol. The reason for analyzing this special case
is threefold: a) it corresponds to a possible scenario in wired communication networks; b) it allows us to
introduce some game-theoretic concepts that can be used to treat more general cases and possibly the DF and
EF protocols; c) it allows us to have more insights on the problem with a more general choice for a(q)r . The
special case under investigation is as follows: Q = 2 and ∀q ∈ {1, 2}, a(q)r = A(q)r ∈ [0, a˜r(1, 1)] are constant
w.r.t. θ. We observe that the strategy set of user i are scalar spaces θi ∈ [0, 1] because we can consider
θ
(1)
i = θi and θ
(2)
i = θi. For the sake of clarity, we denote by hij = h
(1)
ij and gij = h
(2)
ij . Note that the case
a
(q)
r = A
(q)
r can also be seen as an interference channel for which there is an additional degree of freedom
on each band. The choice Q = 2 is totally relevant in scenarios where the spectrum is divided in two bands,
one shared band where communications interfere and one protected band where they do not (see e.g., [32]).
The choice a(q)r = const. has the advantage of being mathematically simple and allows us to initialize the
uniqueness/convergence analysis. Moreover, it corresponds to a suitable model for an analog repeater in
the linear regime in wired networks or, more generally, to a power amplifier for which neither automatic
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gain control is available nor received power estimation mechanism. By making these two assumptions, it
is possible to determine exactly the number of Nash equilibria through the notion of best response (BR)
functions. The BR of player i to player j is defined by BRi(θj) = argmax
θi
ui(θi, θj). In general, it is a
correspondence but in our case it is just a function. The equilibrium points are the intersection points of
the BRs of the two players. In this case, using the Lagrangian functions to impose the power constraint, it
can be checked that:
BRi(θj) =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Fi(θj) if 0 < Fi(θj) < 1
1 if Fi(θj) ≥ 1
0 otherwise
(22)
where j = −i, Fi(θj) , − cijcii θj+ dicii is an affine function of θj for (i, j) ∈ {(1, 2), (2, 1)}, cii = 2|A
(1)
r hrihir+
hii|2|A(2)r grigir+ gii|2ρi; cij = |A(1)r hrihir+hii|2|A(2)r grigjr+ gji|2ρj + |A(1)r hrihjr+hji|2|A(2)r grigir+ gii|2ρj ;
di = |A(1)r hrihir+hii|2[|A(2)r grigir+gii|2ρi+|A(2)r grigjr+gji|2ρj+A(2)r |gri|2+1]−|A(2)r grigir+gii|2(A(1)r |hri|2+
1). By studying the intersection points between BR1 and BR2, one can prove the following theorem (the
proof is provided in Appendix D).
Theorem 4.5 (Number of Nash equilibria for ZDSAF): For the game GAF with fixed amplification gains
at the relays, (i.e., ∂ar
∂θ
(q)
i
= 0), there can be a unique NE, two NE, three NE or an infinite number of NE,
depending on the channel parameters (i.e., hij , gij , ρi, A(q)r , (i, j) ∈ {1, 2, r}2, q ∈ {1, 2}.
Notice that, if Ar = 0, we obtain the complete characterization of the NE set for the two-users two-
channels parallel interference channel. In the proof in Appendix D, we give explicit expressions of the
possible NE in function of the system parameters (i.e., the amplification gain Ar and the channel gains). If
the channel gains are the realizations of continuous random variables, it is easy to prove that the probability
of observing the necessary conditions on the channel gains for having two NEs or an infinite number of
NEs is zero. Said otherwise, considering the pathloss model and arbitrary nodes positioning, there will be,
with probability one, either one or three NE, depending on the channel gains. When the channel gains are
such that the NE is unique, the unique NE can be shown to be:
θNE = θ∗ =
(
c22d1 − c12d2
c11c22 − c12c21 ,
c11d2 − c21d1
c11c22 − c12c21
)
. (23)
When there are three NE, it seems a priori impossible to predict the NE that will be effectively observed in
the one-shot game. In fact, in practice, in a context of adaptive/cognitive transmitters (note that what can be
adapted is also the PA policy chosen by the designer/owner of the transmitter), it is possible to predict the
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equilibrium of the network. First, in general, there is no reason why the sources should start transmitting
at the same time. Thus, one transmitter, say i, will be alone and using a certain PA policy. The transmitter
coming after, namely S−i, will sense/measure/probe its environment and play its BR to what it observes. As
a consequence, user i will move to a new policy, maximizing its utility to what transmitter −i has played
and so on. The key question is: does this procedure converge? This procedure is guaranteed to converge to
one of the NE and a detailed discussion about the asymptotic stability of the NE can be found in Appendix
D. The arguments for proving this have been used for the first time in [33] where the “Cournot duopoly” was
introduced. In [33], the BRs of each player is purely affine, which leads in this case to a unique equilibrium.
The corresponding iterative procedure is called the Cournot taˆtonnement process in [34]. In the case with
three NE, the effectively observed NE can be predicted by knowing the initial network state that is, the
PA policy played by the first transmitting player (see Sec. V). To implement such an iterative procedure, it
can be checked [1] that the transmitters need to know less network parameters than in the original game
where the amplification factor saturates the constraint. In fact, the needed parameters can be acquired by
realistic sensing/probing techniques or feedback mechanisms based on standard estimation procedures. As
a comment, note that in the (modern) literature of decentralized or distributed communications networks
where the optimal PA policy of a transmitter is to water-fill, the mentioned iterative procedure is called
iterative water-filling.
D. Equilibrium analysis for the Time-Sharing scheme
In the previous subsections, we have given sufficient conditions that ensure the existence of the Nash
equilibrium. Our approach is based on the concave games studied in [27] and consists in finding the sufficient
conditions that ensure the concavity of the transmission achievable rates. We have seen that, assuming
ZDSAF or DF relaying protocols, the achievable rates are not necessarily concave.
Assuming that the transmitters can be coordinated, and by using the time-sharing scheme similarly to
Subsec. III-D, the achievable transmission rate of user i is given by:
uTSi (θi, θ−i) =
Q∑
q=1
R
(q),TS
i (θ
(q)
i , θ
(q)
−i ) (24)
where R(q),TSi is the rate user i obtains by using band (q) and time-sharing technique. After Sec. III-D the
latter quantity is:
∀i ∈ {1, 2}, R(q),TSi = α(q)i βj
(q)
R
(q)
i
(
θ
(q)
i Pi
αi
, 0
)
+ α
(q)
i β
(q)
j R
(q)
i
(
θ
(q)
i Pi
αi
,
θ
(q)
j Pj
αj
)
, (25)
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where j = −i, (α(q)i , α(q)j ) ∈ [0, 1]2, (β(q)i , β(q)j ) ∈ [0, 1]2 such that β(q)1 α(q)2 = β(q)2 α(q)1 . These parameters are
fixed and chosen such that the achievable rates are maximized. The rates R(q)i
(
θ
(q)
i Pi
αi
, 0
)
, R
(q)
i
(
θ
(q)
i Pi
αi
,
θ
(q)
j Pj
αj
)
represent the achievable rates in band (q) when time-sharing is used. These rates depend on the relaying
protocol and are given by Eq. (13) for DF and by Eq. (20) for ZDSAF. Notice that, when EF is assumed,
the rates are always concave irrespective of the channel gains and time-sharing techniques do not change
the achievable rate-region.
Theorem 4.6: [Existence of an NE for TS] There always exists at least one pure NE in the PA game GTS,
regardless of the used relaying scheme and the values of the channel gains.
If the users are coordinated (i.e., each user is aware of the moments where the other user is transmitting
or not) then their achievable rates R(q),TSi are always concave w.r.t. θ(q)i . This implies directly that [27],
irrespective of the relaying technique and of the channel gains, the existence of an NE will be guaranteed.
In the particular case where either P (q)r = 0 or h(q)ir = 0, for all q ∈ {1, . . . , Q} and i ∈ {1, 2}, the parallel
IRC reduces to the parallel interference channel [6]. The time-sharing scheme is useless since the achievable
rates are already concave and αi = 1, βi = 1 are optimal. Therefore, Theorem 4.6 guarantees the existence
of the NE in this case and is consistent with the known results in [6].
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
Single-band IRCs: AF vs DF vs EF. Here, we assume Q = 1 and a path loss exponent of 2 that is,
|hij| =
(
dij
d0
)− γ
2 for (i, j) ∈ {1, 2, r}2 where d0 = 5 m is a reference distance and γ = 2 is the path loss
exponent. The nodes S1, S2, D1, D2 are assumed to be located in a plane. The positions of the nodes will be
indicated on each figure and are characterized by the distance between them which are chosen as follows:
d′11 = 11.5 m, d
′
22 = 10 m, d
′
12 = 11 m and d′21 = 14 m. As for the relay, to avoid any divergence for the
path loss in dij = 0, we assume that it is located a hight ǫ = 0.1 m from this plane i.e., the relay location
is given by the (xr, yr, zr) where zr is fixed and equals 0.1 m; thus dij =
√
d′2ij + ǫ
2 for i = r or j = r and
i 6= j. The noise levels at the receiver nodes are assumed to be normalized (N1 = N2 = Nr = 1). In terms
of transmit power we analyze two cases: a symmetric case where P1 = P2 = 10 (normalized power) and an
asymmetric one where P1 = 3 and P2 = 10. The relay transmit power is fixed: Pr = 10. For the symmetric
scenario, Fig. 2 represents the regions of the plane
(
xr
d0
, yr
d0
)
∈ [−4,+4] × [−3,+4] (corresponding to the
possible relay positions) where a certain protocol performs better than the two others in terms of system
sum-rate. These regions are in agreement with what is generally observed for the standard relay channel.
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This type of information is useful, for example, when the relay has to be located in specific places because
of different practical constraints and one has to choose the best protocol. Fig. 3 allows one to better quantify
the differences in terms of sum-rate between the AF, DF and bi-level EF protocols since it represents the
sum-rate versus xr for a given yr = 0.5d0. The discontinuity observed stems from the fact that for the
bi-level EF protocol there is a frontier delineating the scenarios where one receiver is better than the other
and can therefore suppress the interference of the relay (as explained in Sec. III-B).
Number of Nash equilibria for the AF protocol. First, we show that in the PA game with ZDSAF, one can
have three possible Nash equilibria. For a given typical scenario composed of an IC in parallel with an IRC
(Q = 2) and ρ1 = 1, ρ2 = 3, ρr = 2 and the channel gains (g11, g12, g21, g22) = (2.76, 5.64,−3.55,−1.61),
(h11, h12, h21, h22) = (14.15, 3.4, 0, 1.38) and (h1r, h2r, hr1, hr2) = (−3.1, 2.22,−3.12, 1.16), we plot
the best response functions in Fig. 4. We see that there are three intersection points and therefore three Nash
equilibria. As explained in Sec. IV-C, the effectively observed NE in a one-shot game is not predictable
without any additional assumptions. However, the Cournot tatoˆnnement procedure converges towards a given
NE which can be predicted from the sole knowledge of the starting point of the game, namely θ01 or θ02.
Stackelberg formulation. We have mentioned that a strong motivation for studying IRCs is to be able to
introduce relays in a network with non-coordinated and interfering pairs of terminals. For example, relays
could be introduced by an operator aiming at improving the performance of the communications of his
customers. In such a scenario, the operator acts as a player and more precisely as a game leader in the
sense of [35]. In [35], the author introduced what is called nowadays a Stackelberg game. This type of
hierarchical games comprises one leader which plays in the first step of the game and several players (the
followers) which observe the leader’s strategy and choose their actions accordingly. In our context, the
game leader is the operator/engineer /relay who chooses the parameters of the relays. The followers are the
adaptive/cognitive transmitters that adapt their PA policy to what they observe. In the preceding sections we
have mentioned some of these parameters: the location of each relay; in the case of AF, the amplification gain
of each relay; in the case of DF and EF, the power allocation policy between the two cooperative signals at
each relay i.e., the parameter ν(q). Therefore, the relay can be thought of as a player who maximizes its own
utility. This utility can be either the individual utility of a given transmitter (picture one WiFi subscriber
wanting to increase his downlink throughput by locating his cellular phone somewhere in his apartment
while his neighbor can also exploit the same spectral resources) or the network sum-rate (in the case of an
operator). In the latter case, the operator possesses some degrees of freedom to improve the efficiency of
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the equilibrium. In the remaining part of this section, we focus on the Stackelberg formulation where the
strategy of the leader is respectively the relay amplification factor, position and power allocation between the
cooperative signals. The system considered is composed of an IRC in parallel with an interference channel
(IC) [36]. All the simulations provided are obtained by applying the Cournot tatoˆnnement procedure. The
simulation setup is as follows. The source and destination nodes are located in fixed locations in the region
[−L, L]2 of a plane, with L = 10 m, such that the relative distances between the nodes are: d11 = 6.52m,
d12 = 8.32m, d21 = 6.64m, d22 = 6.73m. We assume a path loss model for the channel gains |gij|, |hij|.
For the path loss model we take |hij| =
(
dij
d0
)− γ(1)
2
and |gij| =
(
dij
d0
)− γ(2)
2 for (i, j) ∈ {1, 2, r}2 where
d0 = 1 m is a reference distance. The relay is at ǫ = 0.5 m from the plane. We will also assume that
N
(1)
i = N
(2)
i = Ni, i ∈ {1, 2}, N (1)r will be denoted by Nr and also P (1)r = Pr, A(1)r = Ar, a(1)r = ar,
a˜
(1)
r = ar, ν
(1) = ν.
Optimal relay amplification gain for the AF protocol. First we consider the ZDSAF relaying scheme
assuming a fixed amplification gain ar = Ar (Sec. IV-C). We want to analyze the influence of the value of
the amplification factor, Ar ∈ [0, a˜r(1, 1)], on the achievable network sum-rate at the NE. This is what Fig.
5 shows for the following scenario: ǫ = 0.5 m, P1 = 20 dBm, P2 = 23 dBm, Pr = 22 dBm, N1 = 10 dBm,
N2 = 9 dBm, Nr = 7 dBm, γ
(1) = γ(2) = 2. We observe that the optimal value is A∗r = 0.05 and is not
equal to the one saturating the relay power constraint a˜r(1, 1) = 0.17. This result illustrates for the sum-rate
what we have proved analytically for the individual rate of a given user (see Sec. III-C). Note that the gap
between the optimal choice for ar and the choice saturating the power constraint is not that large and in
fact other simulation results have shown is is generally of this order and even smaller typically.
Optimal relay location for the AF protocol. Now, we consider the ZDSAF when the full power regime
is assumed at the relay, ar = a˜r(θ1, θ2) (Sec. IV-C) and study the relay location problem. Fig. 6 represents
the achievable network sum-rate as a function of the relay position (xR, yR) ∈ [−L, L]2 for the scenario:
P1 = 20 dBm, P2 = 17 dBm, Pr = 22 dBm, N1 = 10 dBm, N2 = 9 dBm, Nr = 7 dBm, γ
(1) = 2.5
and γ(2) = 2. We observe that there are two local maximum that actually correspond to the points that
maximize the individual achievable rates. Many simulation results have confirmed that, when the source
nodes are sufficiently far away from each other, maximizing the individual rate of either user at the NE
amounts to locating the relay on one of the the segment between Si and Di. This interesting and quite
generic observation can be explained as follows. For this purpose, consider Fig. 6 which is a temperature
image representing the values of θ1 and θ2 for different relay positions in [−L, L]2. The region where
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(θ1, θ2) = (1, 0) (resp. (θ1, θ2) = (0, 1)) is the region around S1 (resp. S2). We see that the intersection
between these regions corresponds to a small area. This quite general observation shows that the selfish
behavior of the transmitters leads to self-regulating the interference in the network. Said otherwise, a selfish
transmitter will not use at all a far away relay but leaves it to the other transmitter. Thus, when one transmitter
uses the relay, it is often alone and sees no interference. In these conditions, by considering the path loss
effects it can be proved that the optimal relay position is on the segment between the considered source
and destination nodes. This also explains why the position that maximizes the network sum-rate lies also
on one of the segments from Si to Di.
Optimal relay power allocation at the relay for DF and EF. For the DF protocol, we fix the cooperation
degrees τ1 = 0 and τ2 = 0. In Fig. 7, we plot the achievable sum-rate at the equilibrium as a function of
the relay power allocation policy is ν ∈ [0, 1] (with the convention ν = ν(1)) for the scenario: xR = 0 m,
yR = 0 m, P1 = 22 dBm, P2 = 17 dBm, Pr = 23 dBm, N1 = 7 dBm, N2 = 9 dBm, Nr = 0 dBm,
γ(1) = 2.5 and γ(2) = 2. We observe that, for both protocols, the optimal power allocation ν∗ = 1, meaning
that the relay allocates all its available power to the better receiver, D1. In this case, the relay is in very good
conditions and can therefore reliably decode the source messages. This explains why DF outperforms EF
which is in agreement with the observations we have made in Sec. III. We have observed that, in general,
the network sum-rate is not concave w.r.t. ν ∈ [0, 1] and that the optimal power allocation lies on the borders
ν∗ ∈ {0, 1} for both relaying protocols. In Fig. 7, we also see that the fair PA policy that is, ν = 1
2
can lead
to a relatively significant performance loss.
VI. CONCLUSION
The complete study of PA games in IRCs is a wide problem and we do not claim to fully characterize it
here. One of the main objectives in this paper has been to know whether there exist some stable outcomes
to the conflicting situation where two transmitters selfishly allocate their power between different sub-
channels in multi-band interference relay channels in order to maximize their individual transmission rate.
Our approach has been to consider transmission rates achievable in a decentralized framework where relays
can be deployed with minor or even with no changes for the already existing receivers. For the three types of
protocols considered, we have proved that the utility of the transmitters is a concave function of the individual
strategy, which ensures the existence of Nash equilibria in the power allocation game after Rosen [27]. In a
special case of the AF protocol, we have fully characterized the number of NE and the convergence problem
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of Cournot-type or iterative water-filling procedures to an NE. Although we have limited the scope of the
paper, we have seen that studying IRCs deeply requires further investigations. Many interesting questions
which can be considered as natural extensions of this work have arisen. Considering more efficient coding-
decoding schemes and relaying protocols such as those of [15] and related works, is it possible to prove
that the utilities are still concave functions? For these schemes and those considered in this paper, it is also
important to fully determine the number of Nash equilibria and derive convergent iterative distributed power
allocation algorithms. We have also seen that several power allocation games come into play and need to be
studied when considering DF, EF and AF-type protocols: for allocating transmit power between the different
bands at the sources, for choosing the cooperation degree at the sources, for allocating the power between
the cooperation signals at the relay, for allocating the transmit power over time. Furthermore, a new agent
can come into play (the relay) and several Stackelberg formulations can be used to improve the efficiency
of the equilibria.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 3.2 (ACHIEVABLE TRANSMISSION RATES FOR IRCS WITH THE EF PROTOCOL)
In order to prove that the transmission rate region of Theorem 3.2 is achievable for Gaussian IRCs,
we use a quite common approach [20] for proving coding theorems: we first prove that it is achievable
for discrete input discrete output channels and obtain the Gaussian case from standard quantization and
continuity arguments [20], and a proper choice of coding auxiliary variables.
Definitions and notations
We denote by A(n)ǫ (X) the weakly ǫ-typical set for the random variable X . If X is a discrete variable,
X ∈ X , then ‖X‖ denotes the cardinality of the finite set X . We use xn to indicate the vector (x1, x2, . . . , xn).
Definition A.1: A two-user discrete memoryless interference relay channel (DMIRC) without feedback
consists of three input alphabets X1, X2 and Xr, and three output alphabets Y1, Y2 and Yr, and a probability
transition function that satisfies p (yn1 , yn2 , ynr | xn1 , xn2 , xnr ) =
n∏
k=1
p (y1,k, y2,k, yr,k | x1,k, x2,k, xr,k) for some
n ∈ N∗.
Definition A.2: A (2nR1 , 2nR2, n)-code for the DMIRC with private messages consists of two sets of
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integers W1 =
{
1, ..., 2nR1
}
and W2 =
{
1, ..., 2nR2
}
, two encoders: fi : Wi → X ni ,, a set of relay
functions {fr,k}nk=1 such that xr,k = fr,k (yr,1, yr,2, ..., yr,k−1) , 1 ≤ k ≤ n and two decoding functions
gi : Yni →Wi, i ∈ {1, 2}. The source node Si intends to transmit Wi, the private message, to the receiver
node Di.
Definition A.3: The average probability of error is defined as the probability that the decoded message
pair differs from the transmitted message pair; that is, P (n)e = Pr [g1 (Y n1 ) 6= W1 or g2 (Y n2 ) 6= W2 | (W1,W2) ] ,
where (W1,W2) is assumed to be uniformly distributed over W1 × W2. We also define the the average
probability of error for each receiver as P (n)ei = Pr [gi (Y ni ) 6= Wi | Wi] . We have 0 ≤ max
{
P
(n)
e1 , P
(n)
e2
}
≤
P
(n)
e ≤ P (n)e1 + P (n)e2 . Hence P (n)e → 0 implies that both P (n)e1 → 0 and P (n)e2 → 0, and conversely.
Definition A.4: A rate pair (R1, R2) is said to be achievable for the IRC if there exists a sequence of(
2nR1, 2nR2, n
)
codes with P (n)e → 0 as n→∞.
Overview of coding strategy
At the end of the block k, the relay constructs two estimations yˆnr1(k) and yˆnr2(k) of its observation ynr (i)
that intends to transmit to the receivers D1 and D2 to help them resolve the uncertainty on w1,k and w2,k
respectively at the end of the block k + 1.
Details of the coding strategy
Codebook generation
i Generate 2nRi i.i.d. codewords xni (wi) ∼
∏n
k=1 p (xi,k), where wi ∈
{
1, . . . , 2nRi
}
, i ∈ {1, 2}.
ii Generate 2nR
(1)
0 i.i.d. codewords un1 ∼
∏n
k=1 p (u1,k). Label these un1 (s1), s1 ∈
{
1, . . . , 2nR
(1)
0
}
.
iii Generate 2nR
(2)
0 i.i.d. codewords un2 ∼
∏n
k=1 p (u2,k). Label these un2 (s2), s1 ∈
{
1, . . . , 2nR
(2)
0
}
.
iv For each pair (un1(s1), un2 (s2)), choose a sequence xnr where xnr ∼ p (xnr |un1(s1), un2(s2)) =∏n
k=1 p (xr,k|u1,k(s1), u2,k(s2)).
v For each un1(s1), generate 2nRˆ1 conditionally i.i.d. codewords yˆnr1 ∼
∏n
k=1 p (yˆr1k|u1,k(s1)) and
label them yˆnr1(z1|s1), z1 ∈
{
1, . . . , 2nRˆ1
}
. For each pair (u1, yˆr1) ∈ U1 × Yˆr1, the conditional
probability p(yˆr1|u1) is defined as p(yˆr1|u1) =
∑
x1,x2,y1,y2,yr
p (x1) p (x2) p (y1, y2, yr|x1, x2, xr) p (yˆr1|yr, u1).
vi For each un2 (s2), generate 2nRˆ2 conditionally i.i.d. codewords yˆnr2 ∼
∏n
k=1 p (yˆr2k|u2,k(s2)) and label
them yˆnr2(z2|s2), z2 ∈
{
1, 2nRˆ2
}
. For each triplet (u2, yˆr1) ∈ U2 × Yˆr1, the conditional probability
p(yˆr2|u2) is defined as p(yˆr2|u2) =
∑
x1,x2,y1,y2,yr
p (x1) p (x2) p (y1, y2, yr|x1, x2) p (yˆr2|yr, u2).
vii Randomly partition the message set
{
1, 2, . . . , 2nRˆ1
}
into 2nR
(1)
0 sets
{
S
(1)
1 , S
(1)
2 , . . . , S
(1)
2nR
(1)
0
}
by
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independently and uniformly assigning each message in
{
1, . . . , 2nRˆ1
}
to an index in
{
1, . . . , 2nR
(1)
0
}
.
viii Also, randomly partition the message set
{
1, 2, . . . , 2nRˆ2
}
into 2nR
(2)
0 sets
{
S
(2)
1 , S
(2)
2 , . . . , S
(2)
2nR
(2)
0
}
by independently and uniformly assigning each message in
{
1, . . . , 2nRˆ2
}
to an index in
{
1, . . . , 2nR
(2)
0
}
.
Encoding procedure Let w1,k and w2,k be the messages to be send in block k. S1 and S2 respectively
transmit the codewords xn1 (w1,k) and xn2 (w2,k). We assume that (un1 (s1,k−1), yˆnr1(z1,k−1|s1,k−1), ynr (k − 1)) ∈
A
(n)
ǫ and z1,k−1 ∈ S(1)s1,k and also that
(un2(s2,k−1), yˆ
n
r2(z2,k−1|s2,k−1), ynr (k − 1)) ∈ A(n)ǫ with z2,k−1 ∈ S(2)s2,k . Then the relay transmits the codeword
xnr (s1,k, s2,k).
Decoding procedure In what follows, we will only detail the decoding procedure at the receiver node D1
(at D2 the decoding is analogous). At the end of block k:
i The receiver node D1 estimates sˆ1,k = s1 if and only if there exists a unique sequence un1(s1) that
is jointly typical with yn1 (k). We have s1 = s1,k with arbitrarily low probability of error if n is
sufficiently large and R(1)0 < I(U1; Y1).
ii Next, the receiver node D1 constructs a set L1 (yn1 (k − 1)) of indexes z1 such that
(un1 (sˆ1,k−1) , yˆ
n
r1 (z1|sˆ1,k−1) , yn1 (k − 1)) ∈ A(n)ǫ . D1 estimates zˆ1,k−1 by doing the intersection of
sets L1 (yn1 (k − 1)) and S(1)sˆ1,k . Similarly to [14, Theorem 6] and using [14, Lemma 3], one can
show that zˆ1,k−1 = z1,k−1 with arbitrarily low probability of error if n is sufficiently large and
Rˆ1 < I(Yˆr1; Y1|U1) +R(1)0 .
iii Using yˆnr1(zˆ1,k−1|sˆ1,k−1) and yn1 (k−1), the receiver node D1 finally estimates the message wˆ1,k−1 =
w1 if and only if there exists a unique codeword xn1 (w1) such that
(xn1 (w1), u
n
1(sˆ1,k−1), y
n
1 (i − 1), yˆnr1(zˆ1,k−1|sˆ1,k−1)) ∈ A(n)ǫ . One can show that w1 = w1,k−1 with
arbitrarily low probability of error if n is sufficiently large and
R1 < I
(
X1; Y1, Yˆr1 | U1
)
. (26)
iv At the end of the block k, the relay looks for the suitable estimation of its observation that it
intends to transmit to the receiver node D1 by estimating zˆ1,k. It estimates zˆ1,k = z1 if there exists
a sequence yˆnr (z1|s1,k) such that (un1(s1,k), yˆnr1(z1|s1,k), ynr (k)) ∈ A(n)ǫ . There exists a such sequence
if n is sufficiently large and Rˆ1 > I(Yˆr1; Yr|U1).
From i, ii, iii we further obtain
I(Yˆr1; Yr|U1, Y1) < I(U1; Y1). (27)
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R
′
i(ar) =
a2r
[|mi|2Re(piq∗i )− (|pi|2 + si)Re(min∗i )]+ ar [|mi|2(|qi|2 + 1)− |ni|2(|pi|2 + si)] + (|qi|2 + 1)Re(min∗i )− |ni|2Re(piq∗i )
[|piar + qi|2 + sia2r + 1][|miar + ni|2 + |piar + qi|2 + sia2r + 1]
.
(28)
The achievability proof for the second receiver node follows in a similar manner. Therefore, we have
completed the proof.
From the discrete case to the Gaussian case
As mentioned in the beginning of this section, obtaining achievable transmission rates for Gaussian IRCs
from those for discrete IRCs is an easy task. Indeed, the latter consists in using Gaussian codebooks
everywhere and choosing the coding auxiliary variables properly namely choosing U1, U2, Yˆr,1, and Yˆr,2.
The coding auxiliary variables U1 and U2 are chosen to be independent and distributed as U1 ∼ N (0, ν1Pr)
and U2 ∼ N (0, ν2Pr). The corresponding codewords un1 and un2 convey the messages resulting from the
compression of Yr. The auxiliary variables Yˆr,1, Yˆr,2 write as Yˆr,1 = Yr+Z(1)wz and Yˆr,2 = Yr+Z(2)wz where the
compression noises Z(1)wz ∼ N (0, N (1)wz ) and Z(2)wz ∼ N (0, N (2)wz ) are independent. At last, the relay transmits
the signal Xr = U1 + U2 as in the case of a broadcast channel except that, here, each destination also
receives two direct signals from the source nodes. By making these choices of random variables we obtain
the desired rate region.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 3.4 (OPTIMAL AMPLIFICATION GAIN FOR ZDSAF IN IRCS)
Using the notations given in Theorem 3.4 and also the signal-to-noise plus interference ratio in the capacity
function of Eq. (10) the rate Ri can be written as:
Ri(ar) = C
( |miar + ni|2
|piar + qi|2 + sia2r + 1
)
.
We observe that Ri(0) = C
(
|ni|2
|qi|2+1
)
and that we have an horizontal asymptote
Ri,∞ , lim
ar→∞
R1(ar) = C
( |mi|2
|pi|2 + si
)
. Also the first derivative w.r.t. ar isar is given in (28)
The explicit solution, a∗r depends on the channel parameters and is given here below. We denote by
∆ the discriminant of the nominator in the previous equation. If ∆ < 0, then in function of the sign of
|mi|2Re(piq∗i )− (|pi|2+ si)Re(min∗i ), the function Ri(ar) is either decreasing and a∗r = 0 or increasing and
a∗r = ar. Let us now focus on the case where ∆ ≥ 0.
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1) If |mi|2Re(piq∗i )− (|pi|2 + si)Re(min∗i ) ≥ 0 then
a) if c(1)r,i ≤ 0 and c(2)r,i ≤ 0 then a∗r = ar;
b) if c(1)r,i > 0 and c(2)r,i ≤ 0 then
i) if ar ≥ c(1)r,i then a∗r = 0;
ii) if ar < c(1)r,i then
• if Ri(0) ≥ Ri(ar) then a∗r = 0 else a∗r = ar;
c) if c(1)r,i ≤ 0 and c(2)r,i > 0 then the analysis is similar to the previous case and a∗r ∈ {0, ar}
depending on a(2)r this time;
d) if c(1)r,i > 0 and c(2)r,i > 0
i) if c(1)r,i < c(2)r,i
A) if ar ≤ c(1)r,i then a∗r = ar;
B) if c(1)r,i < ar ≤ c(2)r,i then a∗r = c(1)r,i ;
C) if ar > c(2)r,i then
• if Ri(c(1)r,i ) ≥ R1(ar) then a∗r = c(1)r,i else a∗r = ar;
ii) if c(1)r,i > c(2)r,i then the analysis is similar to the previous case, exchanging the roles of c(1)r,i
and c(2)r,i ;
iii) if c(1)r,i = c(2)r,i then a∗r = ar.
2) If |mi|2Re(piq∗i ) − (|pi|2 + si)Re(min∗i ) < 0 then the analysis follows in the same lines and a∗r ∈
{0, ar, c(1)r,i , c(2)r,i }.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 4.3 (EXISTENCE OF AN NE FOR THE BI-LEVEL COMPRESSION EF PROTOCOL)
We want to prove that for each user R(q)i is concave w.r.t. θ
(q)
i . Consider w.l.o.g. the case of user 1.
The general case of complex channel gains is considered. We analyze the second derivative of R(q)1 given
in Eq. (17). For the sake of clarity we denote by N˜ (q)1 = |hr1|2ν(q)P (q)r + N (q)1 , Γ0 = |hr1|2ν(q)P (q)r and
Γ1 = |h21|2θ(q)2 P2 + N˜ (q)1 . After some manipulations we obtain the following relation: d
2R
(q)
1
d(θ
(q)
1 )
2
= M1 −M2
with Mk = NMkDMk , k ∈ {1, 2} where (for the sake of clarity we have denoted h
(q)
ij by hij):NM1, NM2, DM1,
DM2 are defined by (29),(30).
We observe that the terms Λk ≥ 0, k ∈ {2, . . . , 7}. Also we can easily see from Eq. (29) that M2 ≥ 0,
DM1 ≥ 0. Thus if we prove that NM1 ≤ 0 the concavity of R(q)1 will be guaranteed. In this purpose we
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

NM1 = 2
( |h11|2P12|h1r |2−Λ22P12)|h11|2θ(q)1 P1
Γ0 Λ5
+ 2 Λ8 |h11|
2P1
Γ0 Λ5
−
2
(
Λ8 |h11|
2θ
(q)
1 P1
Γ0
+ Λ6 |h11|2 P1 + |h1r|2 Γ1 P1
)
Λ8 Γ1
Λ5
2Γ0
+2 Λ7 Λ8
2Γ1
2
Γ02Λ53
− 2 Λ7 (|h11|
2P1
2|h1r |
2−Λ2
2P1
2)Γ1
Λ52Γ0
,
NM2 =
[(
Λ8 |h11|
2θ
(q)
1 P1
Γ0
+ Λ6 |h11|2 P1 + |h1r|2 Γ1 P1
)
1
Λ5
− Λ7 Λ8 Γ1
Λ52Γ0
]2
,
DM1 = 1 +
Λ7
Λ5
,
DM2 = DM
2
1 ,
(29)


Λ1 = 2Re(h11h∗1rh∗21h2r),
Λ2 = |h11h∗1r| ,
Λ3 = A
(q)
Λ4 = |h11|2 θ(q)1 P1 + Γ1,
Λ5 =
(
N
(q)
r +N
(q)
wz,1
)
Γ1 + |h2r|2 θ(q)2 P2N˜ (q)1 ,
Λ6 = |h2r|2 θ(q)2 P2 +N (q)r +N (q)wz,1,
Λ7 = Λ6 |h11|2 θ(q)1 P1 + Γ1 |h1r|2 θ(q)1 P1,
Λ8 = |h11|2 P1Λ3 + |h1r|2 P1Λ4 − 2Λ22θ(q)1 P 21 − Λ1θ(q)2 P1P2.
(30)
plug the expressions of Λ5, Λ6, Λ7, Λ8 into Eq. (29) and obtain that NM1 = NNM1DNM1 with NNM1, DNM1
given in (31), (32).
Therefore we obtain the desired result NM1 ≤ 0 and thus M1 ≥ 0, which implies that d
2R
(q)
1
d
(
θ
(q)
1
)2 ≤ 0,
whatever the channel parameters.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 4.5 (NUMBER OF NASH EQUILIBRIA FOR ZDSAF)
Before discussing these situations in detail, let us first observe that the two functions Fi(θj) are decreasing
w.r.t. θj and also Fi(0) = dicii , Fi(θ
o
j ) = 0 where θoj = dicij .
In this section, we will investigate the NE of the game and also their asymptotical stability of each NE
point. A sufficient and necessary condition that guarantees the asymptotic stability of a certain NE point is
related to the relative slopes of the best-response functions and is given by [37] [38]:
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NNM1 = 2P
2
1Γ0
[
P 22
(
θ
(q)
2
)2
|h21|4 |h1r|2 + P 22
(
θ
(q)
2
)2
|h21|2 |h11|2 |h2r|2+(
N˜
(q)
1
)2
|h1r|2 + 2P2 N˜ (q)1 θ(q)2 |h21|2 |h1r|2
]
(
|h21|2 θ(q)2 P2 + Γ0 + N˜ (q)1
)(
θ
(q)
2 P2N
(q)
r |h21|2 + |h2r|2 θ(q)2 P2 N˜ (q)1 +N (q)r N˜ (q)1
)
(
|h1rh21 − h11h2r|2 θ(q)2 P2 + |h1r|2 N˜ (q)1 + |h11|2N (q)r
)
≥ 0
. (31)
DNM1 = − |h11h2r − h21h1r|2 θ(q)1 P1θ(q)2 P2N˜ (q)1 − |h21|2 |h1r|2 θ(q)1 P1θ(q)2 P2N˜ (q)1 − |h11|2 θ(q)1 P1N (q)r N˜ (q)1 −
|h21|2 |h2r|2
(
θ
(q)
2
)2
P 22 N˜
(q)
1 − 2 |h21|2 θ(q)2 P2N (q)r N˜ (q)1 − |h21|4
(
θ
(q)
2
)2
P 22N
(q)
r −
|h21h1r − h11h2r|2 |h21|2 θ(q)1 P1
(
θ
(q)
2
)2
P 22 − |h1r|2 θ(q)1 P1
(
N˜
(q)
1
)2
− |h2r|2 θ(q)2 P2
(
N˜
(q)
1
)2
−(
N˜
(q)
1
)2
N
(q)
r − |h21|2 θ(q)2 P2N (q)r Γ0 −N (q)r Γ0N˜ (q)1 − |h2r|2 θ(q)2 P2N˜ (q)1 Γ0−
|h11|2 |h21|2 θ(q)1 P1θ(q)2 P2N (q)r
≤ 0
.
(32)
∣∣∣∣dBR1dθ2
dBR2
dθ1
∣∣∣∣ < 1 (33)
in an open neighborhood of the NE point. We denote by V(θ1, θ2) an open neighborhood of (θ1, θ2) ∈ [0, 1]2.
1) If d1 ≤ 0 and d2 ≤ 0, then the BR are constants BRi(θj) = 0 and thus the NE is unique (θNE1 , θNE2 ) =
(0, 0), for all cii ≥ 0, cji ≥ 0. The condition (33) is met since
∣∣∣dBR1dθ2 dBR2dθ1
∣∣∣ = 0 for (θ1, θ2) ∈ V(0, 0)
and thus the NE is asymptotically stable.
2) If d1 ≤ 0 and d2 > 0, then it can be checked that the NE is unique, for all cii ≥ 0, cji ≥ 0: θNE1 = 0
and
θNE2 =
∣∣∣∣∣∣
d2
c22
, if d2 < c22,
1 , otherwise.
It can be checked that
∣∣∣dBR1dθ2 dBR2dθ1
∣∣∣ = 0 for (θ1, θ2) ∈ V(θNE1 , θNE2 ) and the NE is asymptotically stable.
3) If d1 > 0 and d2 ≤ 0, then, similarly to the previous item, we have a unique NE, for all cii ≥ 0,
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cji ≥ 0: θNE2 = 0 and
θNE1 =
∣∣∣∣∣∣
d1
c11
, if d1 < c11,
1 , otherwise.
Here as well we have
∣∣∣dBR1dθ2 dBR2dθ1
∣∣∣ = 0 for (θ1, θ2) ∈ V(θNE1 , θNE2 ) and the NE is asymptotically stable.
4) If d1 > 0 and d2 > 0, we have to take into consideration the parameters cii ≥ 0, cji ≥ 0.
a) If F1(1) ≥ 1 and F2(1) ≥ 1, then we have d1 ≥ c12 + c11 and d2 ≥ c21 + c22. In this case the
BR are constants i.e., BRi(θj) = 1 and thus the NE is unique (θNE1 , θNE2 ) = (1, 1). We have∣∣∣dBR1dθ2 dBR2dθ1
∣∣∣ = 0 for (θ1, θ2) ∈ V(1, 1) and the NE is asymptotically stable.
b) If F1(1) ≥ 1 and F2(1) < 1, then we have d1 ≥ c12 + c11 and d2 < c21 + c22. Here also the NE
is unique and θNE1 = 1 and
θNE2 =
∣∣∣∣∣∣
d2−c21
α22
, if d2 > c22,
0 , otherwise.
Similarly, we have
∣∣∣dBR1dθ2 dBR2dθ1
∣∣∣ = 0 for (θ1, θ2) ∈ V(θNE1 , θNE2 ) and the NE is asymptotically
stable.
c) If F1(1) < 1 and F2(1) ≥ 1, then we have d1 < c12 + c11 and d2 ≥ c21 + c22. Here also the NE
is unique and θNE2 = 1 and
θNE1 =
∣∣∣∣∣∣
d1−c12
c11
, if d1 > c11,
0 , otherwise.
Here as well we have
∣∣∣dBR1dθ2 dBR2dθ1
∣∣∣ = 0 for (θ1, θ2) ∈ V(θNE1 , θNE2 ) and the NE is asymptotically
stable.
d) If F1(1) < 1 and F2(1) < 1, then we’ll have d1 < c12 + c11 and d2 < c21 + c22. This case is the
most demanding one and will be treated in detail separately.
At this point an important observation is in order. The discussed scenarios, for which we have determined
the unique NE, have a simple geometric interpretation. If the intersection point (θ∗1, θ∗2) is such that either
θ∗1 ∈ R \ [0, 1] or θ∗2 ∈ R \ [0, 1] then the NE is unique and differs from this point ((θNE1 , θNE2 ) 6= (θ∗1, θ∗2)).
The case 4.(d) corresponds to the case where the intersection point (θ∗1, θ∗2) ∈ [0, 1]2 is an NE point. Now
we are interested in finding whether this intersection point is the unique NE or there are more than one NE.
If 0 < d1 < c11 + c12 and 0 < d2 < c22 + c21 we have the following situations:
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1) If c11c22 = c21c12, then the curves described by θi = Fi(θj) are parallel.
a) If d1 = d2, then the curves are superposed. In this special case we have an infinity of NE that
can be characterized by (θNE1 , θNE2 ) ∈ T where:
T = {(θ1, θ2) ∈ [0, 1]2 ∣∣θ1 = F1(θNE2 )} .
In this case we have an infinity of NE such that
∣∣∣dBR1dθ2 dBR2dθ1
∣∣∣ = 1 for (θ1, θ2) ∈ V(θNE1 , θNE2 )
and the NEs are not stable states. This can be easily understood since a small deviation from a
certain NE drives the users to a new NE point. Thus, the users don’t return to the initial state.
b) If d1 6= d2, then the two lines are only parallel. In this case it can be checked that the NE is
unique and also asymptotically stable since again
∣∣∣dBR1dθ2 dBR2dθ1
∣∣∣ = 0 for (θ1, θ2) ∈ V(θNE1 , θNE2 ). In
order to explicit the exact relation of the NE, one has to consider all scenarios in function of the
sign of the following four relations Fi(0)− 1 and θoj − 1, i ∈ {1, 2}. We will explicit only one
of them. Let us assume that Fi(0)− 1 < 0 and θoj < 0 which means that d1 < min{c12, c12c21c22 }
and d2 < min{c21, c22}. Here we have two sub-cases:
• If d1
c12
< d2
c22
, then the NE is characterized by θNE1 = 0 and θNE2 = d2c22 .
• If d1
c12
> d2
c22
, then the NE is characterized by θNE1 = d1c22c12c21 and θ
NE
2 = 0.
2) Consider c11c22 6= c21c12. Here we have to consider all cases in function of the sign of the four
relations Fi(0) − 1 and θoj − 1, i ∈ {1, 2}. We will focus on only one of them. Let us assume that
Fi(0)− 1 < 0 and θoj − 1 < 0 and thus d1 < min{c12, c11} and d2 < min{c21, c22}. Here we have four
sub-cases:
• If d2
c22
< d1
c12
and d1
c11
> d2
c21
, then the NE is unique: θNE1 = θ∗1 and θNE2 = θ∗2 . Also we have that∣∣∣dBR1dθ2 dBR2dθ1
∣∣∣ < 1 for (θ1, θ2) ∈ V(θ∗1, θ∗2) and the NE is asymptotically stable.
• If d2
c22
> d1
c12
and d1
c11
< d2
c21
, then there are three different NE:
(θNE1 , θ
NE
2 ) ∈ {(θ∗1, θ∗2), (0, d2c22 ), ( d1c11 , 0)}, the intersection point and two other NE’s on the border.
The intersection point is unstable since
∣∣∣dBR1dθ2 dBR2dθ1
∣∣∣ > 1 for (θ1, θ2) ∈ V(θ∗1, θ∗2) but the other
two NE’s are asymptotically stable since
∣∣∣dBR1dθ2 dBR2dθ1
∣∣∣ = 0 for (θ1, θ2) ∈ V(0, d2c22 ) and (θ1, θ2) ∈
V( d1
c11
, 0).
• If d2
c22
= d1
c12
and d1
c11
< d2
c21
, then there are only two different NE: (θNE1 , θNE2 ) ∈ {(0, d2c22 ), ( d1c11 , 0)}.
In this case both of NEs are on the border, one of which represents the intersection point of
the BR’s. It turns out that the intersection point is not a stable NE because
∣∣∣dBR1dθ2 dBR2dθ1
∣∣∣ > 1 for
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(θ1, θ2) ∈ V(0, d2c22 ). However, the other NE is asymptotically stable since
∣∣∣dBR1dθ2 dBR2dθ1
∣∣∣ = 0 for
(θ1, θ2) ∈ V( d1c11 , 0).
• If d2
c22
> d1
c12
and d1
c11
= d2
c21
, then there are two NE: (θNE1 , θNE2 ) ∈ {( d1c11 , 0), (0, d2c22 )}. Here the
analysis of the stability of the two NE’s is similar to the previous case.
In conclusion, the number of NE states depends on the geometrical properties of the best-response
functions. Three different cases can be identified: 1) when the lines θi = Fi(θj) are superposed the game
has an infinity of NE which are not stable; 2) when the lines have a unique intersection point that lies
outside of the borders [0, 1]× [0, 1], the NE is unique and asymptotically stable; 3) when the lines have a
unique intersection point (θ∗1, θ∗2) that lies inside [0, 1]× [0, 1], there can be one, two or three different NE
among which one is identical to this intersection point. In the case where the the NE is unique, it is also
asymptotically stable. When the game has two or three NE, the intersection point (θ∗1, θ∗2) is an unstable
equilibrium while the other/others are asymptotically stable. The best-response algorithm converges to one
of the NE points depending on the initial state of the system.
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Fig. 1. System model: a Q-band interference channel with a relay; q is the band index and q ∈ {1, ..., Q}.
Fig. 2. For different relay positions in the plane
(
xr
d0
, yr
d0
)
∈ [−4,+4]× [−3,+4], the figure indicates the regions where one relaying protocol
(AF, DF or bi-level EF) dominates the two others in terms of network sum-rate.
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Fig. 6. ZDSAF relaying protocol, full power regime. L = 10m, ǫ = 1m, P1 = 20dBm, P2 = 17dBm, Pr = 22dBm, N1 = 10dBm,
N2 = 9dBm, Nr = 7dBm, γ
(1) = 2.5 and γ(2) = 2. (a) Achievable network sum-rate at the NE as a function of (xR, yR) ∈ [−L,L]2 (the
optimal relay position (x∗R, y∗R) = (−1.2, 1.7) lies on the segment between S1 and D1). (b) Power allocation policies at the NE (θNE1 , θNE2 )
as a function of (xR, yR) ∈ [−L, L]2 (the regions where the uses allocate their power to IRC are almost non overlapping.).
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Fig. 7. EF vs. DF relaying protocol. Achievable network sum-rate at the NE as a function of ν ∈ [0, 1] for L = 10m, ǫ = 1m, P1 = 22dBm,
P2 = 17dBm, Pr = 23dBm, N1 = 7dBm, N2 = 9dBm, Nr = 0dBm, γ
(1) = 2.5 and γ(2) = 2. The optimal relay PA ν∗ = 1 is in favor
of the better user and outperforms the uniform relay PA ν = 0.5 for both EF and DF.
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